Sesame in Sudan was never just a cash crop; for decades, it symbolised a core competitive advantage, a major source of foreign currency, and a sector linking rural livelihoods to the global economy. What is unfolding today is not a temporary dip, but a sharp slide from leadership to the margins—just as other countries rapidly occupy the space Sudan has vacated. Global markets have reshaped themselves بسرعة. Demand is at record highs, driven largely by China, which imports between 1.4 and 1.5 million tonnes annually. Yet Sudan—once a pillar of this market—has dwindled to marginal volumes. Niger has surged to become China’s top supplier with over 450,000 tonnes. Tanzania produces around 250,000 tonnes, while Mozambique maintains 100,000–120,000 tonnes despite climate volatility. The most striking transformation comes from Brazil, which expanded production from roughly 50,000 tonnes to over 450,000 tonnes in under four years, leveraging mechanised large-scale farming and cost efficiency. From Dominance to Marginalisation The most alarming shift is not merely in volumes but in market share: 2018: Sudan supplied ~254,935 tonnes to China (≈30.8% market share). 2025: Exports collapsed to 26,618 tonnes (≈1.8%). This represents a loss of roughly 94% of Sudan’s share in the world’s largest sesame market within a few years—a sharp decline from the position of leadership to the margin. The Price Gap That Killed Competitiveness The crisis is brutally exposed in pricing: Brazilian sesame: ~$950/tonne Sudanese sesame: ~$1,450/tonne (Port Sudan delivery) A $500 gap is decisive. Buyers—especially in China—do not purchase legacy or reputation; they purchase price and reliability. Consequently, they shifted toward Niger, Pakistan, Tanzania, Mozambique, and India. Reality on the Ground: Unsold Stock and Trapped Capital The situation is even harsher operationally: Sudanese companies hold unsold inventory inside China. Demand exists—but prices are uncompetitive. Firms face impossible choices: Sell at heavy losses Freeze capital Re-export at additional cost Meanwhile, competitors’ shipments move fluidly and dominate the market. Structural Failure Beyond War While the war accelerated the crisis, it did not create it. It exposed deep structural inefficiencies: Multiple layers of taxes and levies High transport costs Delays and logistical inefficiencies By the time sesame reaches port, its price advantage is already destroyed. A striking example: In Gedaref, the “war support levy” doubled overnight from 2,500 to 5,000 SDG per sack—without cost-impact assessment. Instead of rational restructuring (e.g., reducing quality fees of ~16,000 SDG/tonne), costs were simply increased. Policy Contradictions: Financing and Currency The crisis deepened through contradictory policies: 1. Financing Restrictions The central bank banned financing for crops—including sesame—for nearly two years: Exporters lost liquidity during harvest Storage and aggregation weakened Forward contracting collapsed No economy can demand higher exports while blocking financing of the export crop itself. 2. Exchange Rate Shock Exporters were forced to repatriate proceeds at pre-war rates: Official rate: 480–500 SDG/USD Market rate: >4,000 SDG/USD This is not a loss—it is economic impossibility. The result: Companies exited the market Others halted operations Some shifted to informal channels Sudan effectively lost a large share of its export capacity. The Hidden Crisis: Land Records and Credit Collapse Another overlooked but critical bottleneck: Destruction of the land registry halted issuance of title certificates (key collateral). Since late 2025, recovery efforts have stalled. Firms cannot access financing—not due to insolvency, but lack of documentation. In an agriculture-driven economy, this doesn’t delay activity—it destroys entire seasons. Fragmented Governance: No Coherent Strategy The deeper problem is systemic fragmentation: States impose fees independently Monetary policy ignores market realities Institutions operate in silos Meanwhile: Government-linked firms receive open financing Private exporters—the real market builders—are constrained This inversion cripples competitiveness. Conclusion: The Collapse of a National Competitive Edge All these factors converge into one reality: Sudanese sesame is no longer competitive in its key global markets. Markets do not reward history—they reward performance. If this trajectory continues: The current decline will not remain cyclical It will become a structural exit from the global sesame market Sudan has not lost its natural advantages. It has lost policy coherence, cost discipline, and market alignment. And unless that changes, the “myth” of Sudanese sesame will not merely weaken—it will disappear.